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Introduction 
The beginning of the 20th century witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
As a result, the League of Nations imposed a mandate over the property of the 
Empire, which included Palestine. As a result, British forces took over Palestine 
in 1920. Since then, many political, societal, economic and intellectual move-
ments have emerged to stand against British policies that favoured the non-in-
digenous people of Palestine and the mass immigration of Jews.  
Considering the complexity of the Palestinian political situation and in light 
of the emergence of political parties with different goals, a political division 
between the Palestinian leadership emerged. At the beginning, the conflict was 
between two bourgeoisie, egalitarian families that had links to the Ottoman em-
pire. The political and social conflicts began to rise between the Husayni and 
Nashashibi families, with the crisis breaking out over the leadership of Dar Al-
Ifta and the Supreme Muslim Council. As is argued in this paper, the early stages 
of the Palestinian division greatly contributed to both the loss of historic Pales-
tine and the loss of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, putting the rest of Palestine (West 
Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) under Egyptian and Jordanian admin-
istrations. 
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) emerged to reflect Palestini-
ans’ aspirations in a troubling time and region. The PLO tried to gather all of 
the existing Palestinian factions and movements, attempting to maintain a united 
national movement even within a limited framework. However, for all factions, 
it left a margin of freedom to manoeuvre according to their objectives, regional 
and international allies, and ideologies. Despite this freedom, many conflicts 
and divisions emerged within the PLO itself as well as other parties, many of 
which ended either in violent conflict or the formation of new parties. 
Later, following the defeat of 1967, the fall of all Palestine under Israeli 
occupation, and the 1982 Beirut siege, the Islamic movement emerged with the 
founding of the Islamic Jihad movement, followed by Hamas, which is regarded 
as Palestine’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since then, conflict has arisen 
between Hamas, representing the Islamic movement, and Fatah, representing 
the secular and socialist movements under the PLO. After the signing of the 
Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, the inner conflict surged in the form 
of internal divisions that affected the Palestinian political system. Therefore, the 
transformation of the Palestinian national movements into a semi-state entity 
has contributed to the emergence of the real and tangible Palestinian division 
which began after the signing of the Oslo Accords, having been rejected by 
many Palestinians. 
In 2006, Hamas chose to join Fatah in the political scene by partaking in 
parliamentary elections for the first time, winning by a sweeping majority and 
forming the tenth government of the Palestinian Authority. During this time, a 
multitude of obstacles and conflicts emerged within the Palestinian political sys-
tem. The outcome was an internal conflict that turned homicidal, taking the lives 
of hundreds. It came to a halt through the absolute military control of Hamas’s 
forces over the Gaza Strip. Consequently, the Palestinian national movement 
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reached its most critical turning point in modern history. After 2011 and the 
Arab uprisings, the Palestinian cause has been losing ground amid regional and 
international balances that encouraged both Fatah and Hamas to maintain the 
status-quo of the division. 
Palestinian political life prior to 1948 was influenced and dominated by 
tribal leadership. The political leadership worked as per their tribal agenda ra-
ther than in accordance with a national agenda. Therefore, there were no strate-
gies that would work for the tribal politicians. The lack of strategies led to 
change in the political opinions of the leadership, shifting their positions to-
wards national issues but still relying on personal interests and judgments, and 
lacking clarity as to the issues. The arbitrary decisions and positions of the Pal-
estinian leadership during that period provided a vacuum to the British mandate 
to influence the different parties, manipulating them to serve the mandate’s au-
thorities. Despite the fact that tribalism dominated the political scene, at the be-
ginning of the British mandate, the Husayni family was closer to the national 
demands. The external pressure by the Arab leadership, tribalism and the strug-
gle over power in Palestine tempted them to change their positions far from the 
will of the people. The Nashashibi family took moderate positions towards na-
tional demands. They were lenient on many national issues in order to appease 
the British mandate.1  
 
Tribalism and the Palestinian Division in Mandate Palestine 
One of the most prominent reasons behind the Palestinian division during the 
British mandate was the social structure of Palestinian society, which was di-
vided into three social strata: the urban population, the Bedouin, and the peas-
antry. The dominating group was comprised of the agricultural peasantry; vil-
lages formed the socio-economic basis for the majority of Palestinians. The feu-
dal class mostly controlled society and the peasantry were subjugated by pow-
erful urban families in villages and rural areas. That period witnessed the re-
markable power of the bourgeoisie and their extended families in Palestine, as 
well as the Levantine in general that dominated political and economic life. The 
powerful families managed to control the political and economic spheres 
through working in governmental jobs which they secured through their educa-
tions overseas, primarily in Turkey or Europe. The power of these families was 
crystallised during the fall of the Ottoman Empire in major Palestinian cities 
such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Hebron, and Gaza. 
Tribal extremism developed in Palestine. This essentially comprised of a 
gathering of Arab ethnic nomadic families led by a Sheikh. These tribes were 
subjected to various complications and divisions, the most prominent of which 
was the intervention of the Ottoman military forces to settle the conflict between 
different tribes and the urban population. This conflict led to social alienation 
and division among tribes and urban families.2 The most well-known example 
 
1 Dawas, Rafee (2014) P27; Ibid. 
2  Abdelhadi, Noman (2012). “Palestinian division during the British Mandate under the 
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was the Husayni and Nashashibi conflict. The competition between the Husayni 
and Nashashibi families led to conflict and division among Palestinian elites, 
which can be described as the most notable division during that period. It 
reached all aspects of managerial and governmental positions and was called 
“the Conflict of Interests and Influence.”3  
 
The British Role and the fuelling of the Internal Palestinian Division  
The British authorities, using a strategy of divide and conquer, fuelled the con-
flict between families and ignited the strife among the different classes in Pal-
estinian society in order to break up Palestinian unity and deepen internal divi-
sions.4 
The political antagonism and power struggle between families began at the 
beginning of the 20th century between the Khalidis and Husaynis and, later be-
tween the Husaynis and Nashashibis, due to a change in the leadership positions 
in the bureaucratic and religious administrative apparatus in Jerusalem. The 
main positions that had significant value to the Palestinian population included 
Dar al-Ifta, the   Supreme Muslim Council and the Municipality.5 The race for 
these positions was open, considering that the Palestinian people saw Hajj Amin 
Husayni as the head of the national movement. In 1920, a serious shift in the 
path of the national movement occurred when the movement abandoned the na-
tional interest in favour of prioritising marginal and personal interests. This was 
evident due to the conflict that arose between the Husayni and Nashashibi fam-
ilies over the presidency of the Jerusalem municipality and the Supreme Muslim 
and Fatwa Council. Many of the Palestinian families and tribes were involved 
in this political rivalry, either supporting the Husaynis or siding with the 
Nashashibis. The conflict between the families was reflected in the political 
agenda of both sides. 
The Husaynis, represented by the national movement, announced their op-
position to the High Commissioner, arguing that the Palestinian people never 
recognise Zionist leaders. They called for the boycott of the official inaugura-
tion of Samuel as the High Commissioner. Additionally, the Executive Com-
mittee of the Fourth Conference of the National Movement approved the elec-
tion of a delegation headed by Mousi Kazem Al-Husseini to explain the Pales-
tinian issue in the UK. The committee headed an Arab Boycott Movement of 
the first draft of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), leading to its failure. 
The Husaynis refused the draft on the establishment of an Arab Agency in 1923 
and insisted on the independence of Palestine. The Arab Party rejected the PLC 
in 1935 due to its incompatibility with national demands, its contradiction with 
 
Palestinian Authority”, comparative study, Gaza, Al-Azhar University. 
3 Khela, Mahmoud (1982). “Palestine and the British Mandate: 1922-1939”, Tripoli, the General 
Establishment for Publishing, Distribution and Advertising. 
4  Qumsiyeh, M. B. (2011). Popular resistance in Palestine: A history of hope and 
empowerment (p. 208). London: Pluto Press. 
5 al-Hoot, Bayan (1981). “Political leaders and institutions in Palestine 1917-1948”, Institute for 
Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1. 
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the principles of democracy, and even the Charter of the League of Nations. 
They called for a representative parliament with greater power. However, at the 
beginning of the 1935 revolution, Hajj Amin Husayni was against Al-Qassam, 
arguing, “we are working to resolve the issue peacefully.” In contrast to his po-
sition in the 1935 revolution, Husayni encouraged the strike this time. Headed 
by the Mufti, the Arab Higher Committee was formed by Palestinian parties. 
When the strike got out of control, the leadership sought to join it in order to 
protect their power. 
In 1936, the Arab Higher Committee decided to boycott the Peel Commis-
sion; however, changed its decision for two reasons: to avoid internal division 
that could dissolve the Committee; and because of the strong pressure they were 
under from the Arabs. However, they rejected and denounced the Peel’s draft, 
as well as the White Paper (1939) because it did not fulfil the Arab demands for 
full and immediate independence. Opposing the Husayni family was the 
Nashashibi family, who held their own beliefs towards national issues. Samuel's 
appointment as the High Commissioner of Palestine was met with satisfaction 
from the Nashashibis’ alliances. At the inauguration ceremony, Asim al-Said 
and Ragheb al-Nashashibi gave welcome speeches. They alleged that the dele-
gation of the national movement to London in 1921 did not represent the Pales-
tinian people and stated their full willingness to readjust to the new status quo, 
co-operating with the UK’s mandate government. The Nashashibis and their 
allies accepted the draft on the PLC (1922). The draft failed to get people's ap-
proval. Samuel appointed a few opposition leaders instead of those who had 
been proposed for election. Later, they were forced to resign under grass-roots 
pressure. 
In 1923, the Nashashibi family welcomed the draft of the founding of the 
Arab agency following the Jewish model. Similarly, to the Husayni family and 
their allies, they rejected the Al-Qassam revolution and showed resistance to 
any armed struggle in all its appearances. In 1936, following uncertainties and 
reluctance, Raghib Nashashibi joined the Arab Higher Committee to avoid dis-
pute with the revolutionary groups and to maintain their power. They were un-
interested in revolting against the British. 
Contrary to the position of the Husaynis, the Nashahsibis argued that there 
was a need to deal positively with the Peel Commission. Hassan Sidqi Dajani, 
one of the Nashashibis’ allies, agreed to deal with the Commission. The 
Nashashibis and their allies renounced the draft of the Peel Committee resolu-
tion after its first approval. In contrast to the Husaynis, the Nashashibi family 
and the national defence party accepted the White Paper and showed their read-
iness to cooperate with the British mandate6. 
After 1948, the Palestinian Political division continued to be influenced by 
the Jordanian regime who aimed at taking over the West Bank, considering it as 
 
6 6 Abdelhadi, Noman (2012) P. 97-98. 
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part of the Hashemite Kingdom, and Egypt, who sought to keep the Palestinian 
cause under its umbrella and influence as Pan-Arab regime.  
 
The Establishment of the PLO   
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in 1964 to rep-
resent Palestine in international forums. It included several Palestinian move-
ments and parties. The chairman of the PLO executive committee was consid-
ered to be the president of Palestine. Prior to the establishment of the PLO, the 
Palestinians had been represented at the Arab League since its establishment in 
1945, despite being under the British mandate. The delegates for Palestine in 
that period were Musa Al-Alami, Ahmed Hilmi Abdul Baqi, and Ahmad Al-
Shukairy.7 
On the first Arab Summit in 1964, under the patronage of the Egyptian Pres-
ident, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the PLO was established as the official political 
body to express the will and demands of the Palestinian people, from self-deter-
mination to liberation. The summit called on the Palestinian representative, Ah-
med Al-Shuqairi, to contact Palestinians from both around the world and in Pal-
estine itself, reporting to the summit the year after. Subsequently, Al-Shuqairi 
toured the Arab countries. During his tour, he drafted the national charter and 
the statutes of the PLO. Later on, Al-Shuqairi and his colleagues decided that a 
national conference needed to be organised. As such, Al-Shuqairi chose prepar-
atory committees for the conference, who prepared the lists of the candidates 
for the first Palestinian Conference held in Jerusalem between 28th May and 
2nd June 1964. The conference elected Al-Shuqairi as the chairman. Here, he 
announced the establishment of the PLO, ratified the national charter and the 
statutes of the organisation, and entrusted the Shura Council with the selection 
of 15 permanent members of the Committee. The Conference also decided to 
prepare the Palestinian people militarily and establish the Palestinian National 
Fund, yet without setting out concrete steps.8 
 
The Palestinian Parties and the PLO 
The establishment of the PLO and Al-Shuqairi correspondences for the National 
Conference triggered different reactions among the different Palestinian parties. 
Despite the participation of some leaders of the parties in the first National Con-
ference, Al-Shuqairi asserted that the leaders’ participation in the conference 
was down to personal preference. The establishment of the PLO was received 
differently. One party supported the PLO, arguing that PLO would represent the 
Palestinians in Palestine and Diaspora as well as work to establish a Palestinian 
state. A second group reacted differently. The Arab Higher Committee opposed 
the declaration of the PLO because Hajj Amin Husayni considered himself the 
historical leader and the most deserving representative of Palestine. He believed 
 
7  Saleh, Mohsen (2008). “Methodological studies in the Palestinian case”, Dar Al-Furqan 
Publishing, Jordan P.320. 
8  Abd al-Rahman, As'ad (1987). “The Palestine Liberation Organisation, Its Foundations, 
Founding, Its Path”, Cyprus, Palestinian Research Center”. P.43. 
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that there was no need to establish any organisation in the presence of the Arab 
Higher Committee.  
The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, had a different opin-
ion. They wanted a revolutionary organisation to be a base for the armed strug-
gle. For Fatah, a military organisation should be the basis of any Palestinian 
entity. The Ba’ath Party of Palestine stated that the PLO was not the struggling 
body that would be able to take responsibility for the liberation of Palestine. 
The Arab Nationalist Movement, in a joint statement with the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Students’ Union, and the Pales-
tinian Arab Youth in Lebanon, called for free and fair elections within the PLO. 
They allied with the Arab Higher Committee, who called for fair elections of 
the leadership. The Islamic Liberation Party showed opposition to the PLO 
based on the need for the establishment of the Islamic state and the Jihad in 
order to liberate Palestine.9 The only political group that decided to join the 
PLO after an internal debate was the General Union of Palestinian Students. 
Following their general conference in Gaza in 1964, they decided to be part of 
the PLO. 
The Palestinian factions which called for armed struggle joined the debates 
with Fatah to unify the positions of different parties, agreeing on one national 
programme. Accordingly, Fatah created the slogan, “Al Kifah fi Ard Al 
Ma’raka”, meaning, “the struggle is in the battlefield”. By this, they meant that 
Palestinian unity would be achieved through fighting with the enemy (Israel) 
and not through negotiations.10 Following this, Fatah became the leader of the 
PLO and created political changes in its organisational structure, with the PLO 
becoming the umbrella organisation for the Palestinian movements, organisa-
tions, associations, and individuals. In the PLO charter, every Palestinian is a 
member of the PLO. The armed factions, led by Fatah, dominated the political 
decisions within the PLO, including the fundamental issues related to Palestin-
ian unity. The domination of the armed factions over the PLO’s decision-mak-
ing mechanism led to a “calls-for-dialogue” mantra at every critical turning 
point. 
The PLO factions tended to negotiate national unity through consensus 
among the leaders, avoiding negotiations and political divisions at a social level 
between members of the different factions. The belief among the faction’s lead-
ers is that national unity is guaranteed at a popular level among the Palestinians. 
This shows the misunderstanding of the leadership regarding the complexities 
of the relationship between the political powers and the society and its individ-
uals, as well as negligence of the role of independent political and social actors 
and parties among the Palestinians.11 
 
9  Almoqatel(2019). The Establishment of PLO. Accessed 03/08/2019: 
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Monzmat3/Monazma-Ta/sec03.doc_cvt.htm 
10 Sale, Mohsen et al. “The Palestine Liberation Organisation Evaluation of Experience and 
Reconstruction”, Al Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations – Beirut. P.98. 
11  Shafiq, Moneer (2007). “The Palestine Liberation Organisation and the national unity 
experience”, the Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations – Beirut. P.99. 
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Although the main factor displaying national unity was membership of the 
PLO and its councils, there were always conflicts within PLO and its main char-
ter. The “Barnamij Al-Hadd Al-Adna” (literally ‘the minimal programme') in-
troduced a minimum level of agreements on core national issues within the Pal-
estinian factions. This programme was not only criticised by many factions and 
parties, but many lobbied against it. Almost all factions under the umbrella of 
the PLO had their own charter that went beyond the PLO charter. For example, 
the PLO and Fatah adapted the Democratic State of Palestine, which was re-
jected by the leftist parties, suggesting the Socialist State of Palestine was 
headed by the proletariat. 
The Palestinian national unity was not about a real commitment to a specific 
charter (PLO or a party/faction) in terms of the strict meaning of commitment 
with an adherence to the national and party ideology and values, for example, 
in the cases of Algeria and Vietnam. In the Palestinian case, there was contra-
diction within the parties’ charters and the behaviour of its members, and be-
tween the party and its counter partners in the Palestinian arena. There existed 
Palestinian exceptionalism, where each political party believed that their partic-
ular party carried the truth and their agenda/charter will liberate Palestine and 
represent the Palestinians. 
Palestinian exceptionalism is a result of the nature of Palestinian society in 
Palestine and in its diaspora, as well as the fragmentation and disintegration of 
the Arab countries and regimes who exert huge influence on the Palestinian fac-
tions. As a result, all models that were borrowed from the resolution of other 
nations’ struggles failed utterly whenever the Palestinians used them. The Pal-
estinians lived in a mess and became masters of a political life where contradic-
tions created sensitive and difficult relationships amongst Palestinians. 
For example, there was always a charter, and there were always recommen-
dations issued by the National Council. Yet, each party had an independent 
strategy, which varied in accordance with their differing ideologies. Meanwhile, 
a dialogue was present between the parties, as well as continued participation in 
the National Council, Executive Committee and the Joint Leadership. 
In 1974, the Fatah leadership, in agreement with the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation (DFLP) of Palestine, agreed on what has been called the 10-point 
interim programme. The DFLP announced the programme, under the request of 
Arafat as a trial balloon in front of all other parties, including Fatah. The pro-
gramme contradicted Fatah principles, the national charter, the previous deci-
sions of the National Council, and many Arab countries/regimes’ public deci-
sions. 
This experience outlined the characteristics of intra-Palestinian dialogues, 
Palestinian unity, the extent of adherence to the charter, and a possibility of 
agreeing to a single Palestinian programme. The announcement of the pro-
gramme led to the establishment of the Opposition Front and the withdrawal of 
its representatives from the different PLO’s Committees. Many parties, includ-
ing the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), froze their mem-
bership but did not leave the PLO. The Opposition Front remained within the 
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framework of Palestinian unity under the umbrella of the PLO. Fatah’s leader-
ship tried to convince the Opposition Front and other parties to return to the 
PLO and the executive committee and oppose the 10-point programme; some 
parties accepted the proposal during the 1970s and 1980s12. Arafat and Fatah 
were trying to demonstrate national unity, albeit that unity in reality was mini-
mal or merely a formality to strengthen their positions internationally and re-
gionally. 
 
The Islamic Movements in Palestine 
The emergence of the Islamic movements in Palestine at the time was a result 
of several crises within Palestinian society. Some of these movements tend to 
employ religious ideology as a form of resistance.13 
This coincided with the decline of Pan-Arabism in general and the shattered 
Arabian positions towards Israel, especially after Sadat's visit to Israel and the 
signing of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. It coincided 
with the failure of all of the struggling national projects adopted by the PLO. 
The Islamic movements came as a result of the decline in influence after the 
Beirut siege and the PLO’s exit from Beirut in 1982. It also coincided with the 
ending of the Palestinian military existence in Lebanon. All of these factors re-
inforced the role of religious factors within Palestinian society, especially after 
crystallising the active tendencies of the Muslim Brotherhood, which consid-
ered the Palestinian issue to be the central issue of the region. 
 
The Division of the Islamic Party in Palestine 
The dispute between the Al Jihad Al-Islami (AA) movement and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) is not based on ideological or epistemological grounds, but 
rather on the concept of the "right understanding" of Islam, and how to behave 
under its guidance. It is important to note that the disagreements between the 
Islamic Jihad movement and the MB began to emerge when tackling issues re-
lated to the details of major goals and the ways to paths to achieve them, starting 
from the liberation of Palestine, as the heart of the Islamic world, to establish 
the Islamic State. Thus, for both groups, Palestine’s liberation is a religious duty 
before being a national and human rights issue. Both parties practice and edu-
cate others in this belief. 
With the start of the AA movement in the early 1980s, their dispute with the 
MB arose. The Brotherhood viewed the AA as a rival and wanted “to pull the 
rug out from under their feet.”14 Another major distinction between the MB and 
AA is the intellectual discourse of the jihadists (or those who were then called 
"independent Islamists," "Islamic student movement," and the "Islamic revolu-
tionary party”). These parties focused on the search for national independence, 
 
12 Al-Hoot, Shafiq (2007). “Between the homeland and the exile from Jaffa began the journey”, 
Riyad Al Rayes Publishing, Amman. P.248. 
13 Al-Barghooti, Samir (2008). “Features of the Palestinian political elites: before and after the 
Palestinian Authority”, Beirut, Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations. P.151. 
14 Interview, Islamic Jihad activist from 1980, Gaza (via telephone, February 2019). 
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far from a religious identity. They saw the Arab-Palestinian identity as an addi-
tional identity, coming after the national identity. This constituted an additional 
difference compared to other Islamic parties in the region.15 
The AA movement differs in many key points to Hamas, which represent 
MB in Palestine. The AA movement criticised Hamas for their absence from 
the field of Jihad and military struggle. According to Fathi Shikaki, “if the ab-
sence of Jihad in the Islamic movement was understandable and justified in the 
fifties and sixties because the battle had not yet resolved in favour of Islam as a 
single choice. It is impossible to understand or justify this astonishing absence 
of the Islamic movement now (i.e. the 1980s) from taking its real position in the 
fronts, directing the course of the struggle, and controlling its variants.”16 AA, 
in some of its members’ writings, blame MB thinkers for what was instilled in 
the youth of the Islamic movement. They accused the MB of creating ‘inaction’ 
because the training methods adopted by the MB were mostly static, social, po-
litical, economic, and intellectual which are far from reality and society. 
AA believes that finding solutions to the problems in Arab society cannot 
be resolved gradually. Thus, on the face of it, they reject the ideas of the MB 
about the slow spread of ideas and traditional practice in all aspects of daily life. 
The alternative is revolutionary action by a capable Islamic vanguard to impose 
an Islamic regime that will liberate Palestine. While the MB sees the essential 
problem of the nation as being the absence of a single Islamic state represented 
by the Khilafa, and that the Palestine issue is one of the sub-problems in light 
of this absence, AA sees the Palestine issue as the central issue of the Islamic 
world. The focus of the MB was on education and preparation to oppose the 
nationalists, emphasising armed struggle. According to AA’s literature, “the 
Brotherhood chose the path of education and guidance and not the path of Jihad, 
while the nationalists chose the path of Jihad.” Moreover, it emphasised the 
uniqueness of Islamic Jihad in focusing on the dialectical relationship between 
the path of jihad and the path of guidance. 
Overall, the relationship between the two parties was certainly characterised 
by rivalry, hostility, and mutual defamation, especially during the 1980s. This 
view is based on the Brotherhood's view of the Jihad movement as a splinter 
group from the parent organisation; one that is reluctant to face the Israeli oc-
cupation in the armed struggle. 
The accusations of AA towards the MB could be summarised as the failure 
to act, receiving funds from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, intellectual backwardness 
and organisational stagnation. The MB represented by Hamas accused AA of 
Shi'ism, representing a bridge for Iran in the region by receiving support from 
the Iranian government. MB also accused AA of working to block the Islamic 
movement in Palestine, as well as lacking creditability by claiming other 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Beit Almaqdis(1989)The Path of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Beit Al Maqdis for Publish-
ing 1989. Beirut. 
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factions’ military operations as their own. One of the major accusations that has 
been used, and is still being used today, is that AA is forming an alliance with 
secular forces against the MB. 
Historically, the clashes between AA and Hamas were in areas that both of 
them had large numbers of activists and activities. The clashes were never at the 
Gaza Strip level. They were smaller, and some of the differences between the 
two movements were reflected at mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
For example, the banners and flags of each movement were found in front of 
different mosques in close proximity, some of them, the green banners of Ha-
mas, and others black for the jihad movement. Thus, mosques were divided, and 
individual mosques were known as either belonging to Hamas or AA. 
 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PLO and the Peace Process  
According to the charter of Hamas, the organisation respects the Palestinian 
National Movement and the PLO and appreciates their efforts. However, Hamas 
rejects the idea of secularism because it believes that this will not lead to the 
liberation of Palestine. Hamas stressed the rule of national unity, the inviolabil-
ity of Palestinian blood, and the avoidance of any Palestinian-Palestinian 
fighting. However, when Arafat and Abbas made the offer for Hamas to join 
PLO, prior to 2003, Hamas rejected the idea. Hamas agreed at a later stage, but 
with conditions, including, rejecting political solutions, refusing to recognise 
Israeli and UN resolutions, and demanding 40 per cent of the seats in the Na-
tional Assembly. The PLO refused these conditions.17 
AA refused to join the PLO and the peace process. It refuses all varieties of 
alliances with secular movements. It also did not participate in the membership 
of the unified leadership of the First Palestinian Intifada, which was formed by 
the nationalists. Moreover, it continued its opposition in the first and second 
legislative elections. AA is a member of the coalition of the Palestinian Forces 
that oppose any peaceful settlement (the ten factions).18 
AA was able to enter the political arena because of the fragmentation of the 
nationalist movements and the decline of the left-wing camp as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union looked more likely. The power of the PLO was declining, and 
it became bankrupt. Islamic movements were able to impose their influence in 
the occupied territories to fill the gap of PLO and the nationalists. They used the 
Islamic factor in society, firstly mobilising people through mosques and then 
through the Intifada. 
 
Palestinian Division and the Palestinian Authority 
After the PLO made an error in assessing the situation in the Gulf crisis and did 
not take a clear stand against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, its relationship with 
all the Gulf States, Egypt, and Syria became strained, and it clashed with the 
United States and Europe. It was besieged financially and lived in a state of 
 
17 Nofal, Mamdouh (1996). “The Solicitation of the Negotiations of the Palestinian-Israeli Track in Madrid”, Dar Al 
Shorouk, Jordan. P.149. 
18Abdelhadi, Noman (2012). Ibid. P.148. 
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turmoil and worry. Under difficult circumstances regionally and internationally 
in the aftermath of the joint alliance victory in the Gulf War, and under the 
emergence of a global unipolar system, the USA announced an initiative where 
it gathered all the Arab parties, including the PLO, at the Madrid Peace Confer-
ence. Meanwhile, a Norwegian-sponsored secret channel was opened in Oslo, 
which later led to the Oslo peace agreement between the PLO and the Israeli 
entity. The signing of the Oslo Accords was in complete contradiction to the 
Hamas guidelines, which were based on the fact that the land of Palestine was 
an Islamic nation which should not be neglected. Hamas therefore adopted a 
line of opposition to any peaceful solutions, considered the signing of the Oslo 
agreement to be a national betrayal, and refused to participate in the Palestinian 
Authority or to join the first legislative elections.19 
 
Palestinian Dialogue and Yasser Arafat: 
Arafat’s internal policies towards Hamas and other factions relied on direct dis-
cussion between him and these factions. Arafat recognised that in order to be 
respected by your opponents, you must respect and recognise them. He went 
face to face, avoiding divergence from the first moment of rivalry or disagree-
ment.20 In light of the differences of views and the different ideologies between 
the Palestinian Authority, the Fatah movement, and the opposition led by Ha-
mas, internal dialogues were needed to reach any kind of commonality between 
different political factions. Therefore, Arafat invited many activists and leaders 
to meet in Sudan prior to the deployment of the PA forces in the Gaza strip.  
The first official meeting of the dialogue between the Palestinian Authority 
and Hamas after the decision of the Council of Ministers was on November 2, 
1996, and it took place in the office of General Amin al-Hindi, head of the Gen-
eral Intelligence Service and under the chairmanship of the Secretary General 
of the Presidency Tayeb Abdel Rahim. The meeting included Tariq Aborbaj, 
Rashid Abu-Qabq, Mohammed al-Masri, and Emad Falouji from the Palestin-
ian Authority, and Mahmoud al-Zahar, Ismail Haniyeh and Ismail Abu-Shanab 
from Hamas. Both parties agreed that Hamas must stop its military action in 
order to enable the Authority to implement peace process agreements while sub-
sequently re-evaluating the situation together. They also agreed that “wanted 
fighters” from Hamas would be surrendered to PA forces with full guarantee of 
protection. They also agreed to prevent incitement against Israel and the PA. 
Lastly, they agreed that Hamas had the right to exercise its political activities 
based on the principle of political pluralism.21 
Following this meeting, another expanded meeting was held in July 1997 at 
the headquarters of the PLC in Gaza. Both parties agreed on developing a new 
strategy and plan for the national dialogue secretariat, establishing a specialised 
 
19 Saleh, Mohsen (2008). Ibid. P.160. 
20  Nafez Alwan: Why did not Hamas coup against Yasser Arafat?, the site of civilized dialogue. 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=328157 
21 Al-Falouji, Emad (2008). “From the heart of power: President, Ministry, Legislative”, Yazji 
Library, Gaza. P.226. 
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committee that assisted in encouraging dialogue between the parties, and lastly, 
meeting periodically to follow up on timely issues and meeting with Arafat.22 
These meetings cultivated a general meeting called “the National Unity 
Conference to meet the challenges” on July 20, 1997 in Gaza. The conference 
was a breakthrough in the internal Palestinian dialogue in the presence of Pres-
ident Yasser Arafat. Several key issues were discussed at the conference, in-
cluding negotiations with the Israeli occupation, the issue of political prisoners, 
the consolidation of the concept of national unity as a practice on the ground, 
the promotion of the concept of resistance, accountability, corruption, and the 
promotion of democracy. 
During this period, the meetings of the Committee of the Secretariat, con-
sisting of Tayeb Abdel Rahim, Rawhi Fattouh, Ibrahim Aboulnja and Emad Fa-
louji, took place with all factions as a practical interpretation of the resolutions 
and recommendations of the National Unity Conference.23 President Yasser Ar-
afat was able to embrace Hamas, containing it as much as possible, and open 
the doors of dialogue with its leaders despite the divergence of political and 
ideological ideas and policies between the two parties. During this period, 
Yasser Arafat managed to control the political arena with minimal losses. On 
the other hand, Hamas dealt with the new political reality. 
 
The Reign of Abbas 
On September 9, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas, Fatah’s candidate, assumed the pres-
idency of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in a dangerous period of 
time, namely, the ongoing Palestinian Second Intifada which began in Septem-
ber 2000. 
In Abbas’ first year as the president, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
proposed his plan of unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip settlements. The 
PA demanded that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza be an agreement between 
the parties instead of unilateral decision and plans. This new reality forced Pres-
ident Abbas to work on holding a conference for national dialogue with all Pal-
estinian factions to discuss the upcoming new reality and how to deal with it.24 
 
Cairo Declaration 2005 
The Arab Republic of Egypt called on the Palestinian factions to hold a wider 
national dialogue in Cairo with the participation of President Mahmoud Abbas 
and another ten factions and organisations which declared a commitment to a 
cease-fire in exchange for Israel's cessation of hostilities in the Palestinian ter-
ritories. The Cairo declaration stressed commitment to the “Palestinian Red 
Lines”, and the right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation, estab-
lishing a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Moreover, 
they stressed upholding the rights of refugees to return to their homes and 
 
22 Ibid. P.227. 
23  Ibid. P.227. 
24 National Dialogue Conference: The Way to the State, the Foundation for Cooperation to Resolve the Conflict, 31-
10-2010. 
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properties. The declaration included what has been called the “2005 pro-
gramme” which is based on the commitment to the continuation of the current 
status-quo of the ceasefire in exchange for an Israeli commitment to stop all 
forms of attacks on the Palestinians, as well as the release of all political pris-
oners and detainees. 
The most important elements of the Cairo declaration focus on the internal 
political situation. The declaration called for a comprehensive political and ad-
ministrative reform in sectors, support of the democratic transitions, and the 
holding of local and legislative elections in a timely manner in accordance with 
the agreed electoral law. However, the conference recommended that the Leg-
islative Council should amend the electoral law. According to the declaration, 
the new electoral system had to be a mixed system, and for the local councils, a 
proportional system. Besides that, the factions engaged in the Cairo dialogue 
agreed to revitalise and develop the PLO and its institutions, agreeing the PLO 
to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Therefore, a 
new committee was established to lay down the main principles of the PLO’s 
development and revitalisation. However, neither Hamas and AA showed will-
ingness to be part of the PLO nor agreed on its charter. Lastly, and crucially, the 
conference resolutions stressed that dialogue is the only way to achieve national 
unity amongst the factions, and a dialogue where they affirmed the prohibition 
of resorting to weapons in internal divisions and fragmentations.25 
 
Hamas in 2006 
Hamas won the legislative elections in January 2006, and became the ruling 
party while Fatah, for the first time, had to sit in the opposition seats. A demo-
cratic situation could have occurred if there was a real dialogue and a true dem-
ocratic transition. The absence of democratic practices on both sides led to cat-
astrophic consequences. In 2006, the reality of the real division began due to a 
lack of the basic fundamentals of a democratic and peaceful transition of power 
after the political coup.26 For the first time in modern Palestinian history, a non-
member of the PLO and an Islamist faction – one that is hostile to the PLO, 
nationalists and secular parties – had to share power with the PLO. 
The electoral results contradicted expectations, surprising everyone in the 
region as well as the international community. Despite that, President Abbas 
announced his acceptance of the results and delivered his speech to the Pales-
tinian people, reminding Hamas of several political points. He asserted that this 
was a true election by the Palestinian people according to a programme based 
on negotiations and peaceful resolution to the conflict. He urged the next gov-
ernment to win the confidence of the international community. 
Hamas succeeded in forming the tenth government alone, headed by Ismail 
Haniyeh, who swore an oath before President Mahmoud Abbas, assuming his 
 
25 The literal text of the Cairo Declaration issued by the Palestinian factions on 17-3-2005, 
Information Center http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4894 
26 Al-Falooji, Emad (2010). “Palestinian Dialogue”, Yazji Library, Gaza. P.158. 
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duties as a prime minister. Nevertheless, Israel announced that it would not deal 
with the new government and imposed a blockade on Gaza. Internal divisions 
started to surface, especially the relationship between Hamas’s prime minister 
and the security services controlled entirely by Fatah, such as the intelligence 
services and preventative security. The contradiction became clear and Abbas 
was unable to resolve a lot of issues. The security unrest actually preceded Ha-
mas’s victory, which pushed the Interior Minister, Said Siyam (assassinated by 
Israel in 2009), to make a decision to form the Executive Force (EF), which 
were a special security unit associated with him personally, to carry out the re-
quired security tasks.27 
Amid the political and security tensions, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails 
issued their national dialogue document, the "Prisoner’s document" in May 
2006. As a result, Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian factions held several dialogue 
meetings to break the deadlock and form a national unity government. From 
2006 to June 2007, dozens of Palestinians were killed in the clashes between 
Fatah and Hamas. The tension continued, which caused Saudi Arabia to invite 
Fatah and Hamas to Mecca. The dialogues ended in the signing of the Mecca 
agreement between Fatah and Hamas and the government of national unity 
headed by Ismail Haniyeh was formed. However, the government failed to ad-
dress the security situation on the ground. This led to the resignation of Interior 
Minister Qawasmi in May 2007. In June 2007, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, 
killing dozens of Fatah and PA personal, and declaring sovereignty of the Gaza 
Strip. As a result, the president dismissed the Haniyeh government and declared 
a state of emergency, marking the beginning of a dark phase in the history of 
the Palestinian people. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank became geograph-
ically, politically, and socially divided with Hamas controlling the Gaza Strip 
with an iron fist, and Fatah controlling the West Bank.28 
The Contemporary Palestinian Division 
Palestinian political scientist, Ibrahim Ibrash, argues that what happened in 
June 2007 (he referred to it as a coup d'état) can be traced back to the beginning 
of Hamas activities in 1987. According to him, what happened occurred due to 
a culmination of differences and ideological collisions over time. The conflict 
between Hamas and the PLO began with the establishment of Hamas in late 
1987 and gradually deepened until they were able to undermine the pillars of 
the Palestinian national project.29 
The parties were unable to reach an agreement in the 1980s or during the 
first Intifada. When the PLO moved to Gaza, a sensitive, yet crucial dialogue 
took place. From 1994 until 2002, the PA dealt with Hamas from a security 
 
27 Ibid. P.159. 
28 Eitany, Maryam (2008). “Conflict of Powers between Fatah and Hamas in the Administration 
of the Palestinian Authority 2006-2007”, Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations – 
Beirut. P.51. 
29 Ibraash, Ibrahim (2008). “The roots of the Palestinian division and its dangers on the national 
project”, Journal of Palestinian Studies, Beirut, Issue 78. P.1. 
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perspective and not as a political party. It tightened its iron fist upon Hamas and 
its activists until the beginning of the Second Intifada. After Al-Aqsa Intifada, 
the balance of power changed. After much dialogue, and many meetings and 
conferences, the two parties (together with all the Palestinian factions) reached 
the Cairo Agreement in March 2005. The agreement included clear articles that 
municipal and legislative elections should be held on time, and on the recon-
struction of the PLO and reform of the Palestinian Authority. The objective of 
the agreement was to unite the shattered Palestinian forces.30  
Despite the fact that there were some obstacles in the implementation of the 
agreement, the general trend in 2005 pointed towards a new political era of part-
nership and democracy. However, as soon as the legislative elections came 
about, the whole situation changed, and the conflict returned with vigour. Con-
sequently, the conflict escalated until division became a reality. 
The Palestinian division, and the reality of the PLO and PA in terms of bu-
reaucracy and democracy, can be described as a multi-level division. The Pal-
estinian political system from which the Palestinian Authority forms its main 
pillar is too small to accommodate all of the political powers in Palestinian so-
ciety. The PA system is designed and established to fit only forces and factions 
who are linked to the peace process. Therefore, the great majority of the leaders 
who were associated with and participated in the peace process rejected the re-
sults of the legislative elections. 
Just before Hamas assumed their term in the PLC, the Fatah dominated 
council changed many laws and regulations to create barriers and obstacles for 
the incoming Hamas council. All political parties refused to be part of Hamas’s 
national unity government. It was clear from the beginning through media in-
citement that Fatah leaders had decided to hinder Hamas’s government work. 
Many of those leaders issued childish statements, threatening Hamas leaders, 
Hamas activists and the public, accusing Hamas of not doing its job as a gov-
ernment. The unstable, chaotic security situation manifested itself in the multi-
tude of shootings and the security/military conflict between Fatah and Hamas. 
Besides, Hamas did not expect their political victory, as their leaders stated on 
many occasions, nor did they expect Fatah’s reaction, including the siege from 
the Arab States and the international community.31  
As soon as Hamas won the elections, Israel mobilised the international com-
munity and many Arab States to impose a siege on the Palestinian government 
formed by Hamas. They requested that Hamas recognise Israel, and all the ac-
cords signed between the PLO and Israel, as well as that Hamas ensured the 
security of Israel. With these conditions in place, many Fatah leaders felt as-
sured that Hamas would fall. Therefore, they escalated the security unrest by 
funding and tolerating tribal militias, rejecting Hamas’s ministers’ orders and 
 
30 Palestinian Strategic Report 2006, Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, Beirut, 
Lebanon, 2006. P. 23-48. 
31  Abdul Sattar Qassem: Gaza between the lamentations and the movement of history 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B1808688-EA40-49DC-9D9F.htm 
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using the media to incite against Hamas, under the slogan of “No Hope for Re-
form and Change” under Hamas rule.  
In addition to that, Hamas had misread the local, regional and international 
political spectrum. They claimed that the Gaza Strip was a liberated area, as-
suming that there was a possibility to establish a political entity where they can 
(Hamas) rely on the Arabs through the Egyptian borders. According to 
Mahmoud Zahar “We are relying on our Arab and Muslim Brothers”. After that, 
Hamas made an erroneous decision by establishing a Hamas-only government, 
insisting that they were able to break the siege. A third grave mistake was taking 
the responsibility of Gaza after 2007 by establishing their own de-facto govern-
ment. In reality, Hamas’s leadership was in no way prepared for the enormous 
challenges ahead of them.  
 
Remarks on the Contemporary Palestinian Division 
Since its formal engagement in the Palestinian political scene and winning the 
elections, Hamas dealt with the political situation using a ‘piece-by-piece’ 
model, meaning that they did not have a complete vision of the political reality 
and the challenges that faced them as a government. In the beginning of the 
governance crisis, Hamas was unable to pay public sector employees’ salaries. 
When Hamas was able to collect the part of these salaries through cash dona-
tions from around the world, they were surprised that they could not transfer 
them via the international system of banks as well as locally. Therefore, they 
had to carry millions of dollars in cash in bags and suitcases. They were also 
surprised at the huge shortage of goods. This was a result of the Israeli siege and 
the international community’s measures taken to deal with Hamas, as well as 
the refusal of Hamas to end the military control over the Gaza Strip. The general 
belief was that the siege would end. In fact, the siege was partially left over after 
the Arab Spring and the election of Mohamed Morsi as the Egyptian president.  
Hamas was subjected to a blackmailing strategy from the very beginning of 
its electoral victory. The process of bringing Hamas closer to the political pro-
gramme adopted by Mahmoud Abbas and his circle of Fatah leaders started 
from the beginning of the national dialogue. The process of establishing the 
tenth PA government led by Hamas, Abbas threatening to invite a national ref-
erendum to repeat the elections, the Mecca agreement, and the armed conflict 
forced Hamas members and leadership to not trust the Fatah leadership, and to 
ensure that many Fatah leaders would be unwilling to reach a political agree-
ment based on sharing the power, or as has been known in Gaza, “dividing the 
cake”. 
Many try to portray the conflict between Hamas and Fatah in 2006 and 2007 
as if it was a conflict of power (which it has later become). The observations on 
the ground suggest more strongly that the conflict was between two sides of the 
Fatah party. The first camp represented the legacy of Yasser Arafat, who tried 
to learn from their mistakes after the Oslo Accord, mainly not turning the PA 
and Fatah into a security agent ensuring Israel security. The second camp rep-
resented Mahmoud Abbas and his allies, who saw security coordination with 
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Israel to be an unquestionable strategy at any cost. Abbas’s camp believed that 
the Palestinian militarisation of the Second Intifada as being reason behind the 
deadlock in the peace process. As soon as Arafat was removed from the political 
scene, Abbas’s camp found Hamas and its military force to be the only power 
that could constitute a barrier towards complete control of the Palestinians in an 
autocratic regime. Their attempts to tame Hamas came after their attempt to take 
control over Fatah in a brutal way that included armed conflict and political 
assassinations.  
As Hamas’s political, military and social power was at its peak, Abbas’s 
camp was confused with how to deal with Hamas. They questioned whether 
they should eradicate Hamas militarily or contain Hamas politically. As the 
costs of a military conflict were too great, they opted to give Hamas a chance 
to be part of the political system by giving them few seats in parliament. During 
that time, the majority of the Fatah leadership was almost sure that Hamas 
would take a maximum of 20 per cent of the seats.  
The results of the elections represented a political earthquake that forced 
many Fatah leaders to vow to topple Hamas. However, Hamas struggled to the 
end until they took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007. Hamas’s decision 
to take over the Gaza Strip and put an end to the Fatah leadership control over 
the Gaza Strip was the result of a strong belief that Abbas forces were about to 
take strong measures against them. According to many Hamas members, “we 
were not ready to give up. We could not tolerate to be back in the PA prisons 
with daily torture. We wanted revenge and also take over”. For Hamas, the end 
of their success in elections and power was sacred. They see it as the first Islamic 
experience after the change of the international system (West Vs. USSR), and 
the Algerian civil war. According to Hamas’s leader, “The end of our govern-
ance, was a death sentence for us and for any Islamist party in the region who 
would win the elections or assume power”. 
The fundamental reason for the contemporary Palestinian division is ideo-
logical. The Fatah movement believes that diplomacy and the peace process is 
the only way to deal with the Palestinian problem. Fatah addresses the conflict 
through negotiations and through international organisations. Fatah sees the fu-
ture of Palestine as a democratic and secular state. Fatah and the PLO believe 
that the two states solution is the only feasible one based on UNSC resolutions 
338, and 242. On the contrary, Hamas believes that the armed struggle with 
Israel is the only possible option. It may believe in a temporary solution, such 
as signing a time-limited truce, but it refuses to recognise Israel. Hamas believes 
that an independent Palestinian state must be based on Islamic laws, and there-
fore rejects the option of a secular state. 
Another reason for the division between Fatah and Hamas is that Hamas’s 
aim is to take full control of all of the Palestinian territories in order to prevent 
any secular or leftist ideology. Therefore, the success of Hamas’s project de-
pends primarily on its ability to control the land and the people. Fatah's view 
reflects that Hamas’s control of the territories means a Palestinian State in Gaza 
only. Therefore, Hamas’s control of Gaza alone significantly hinders the goals 
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and visions of the PLO and the nationalists’ project to create a secular and dem-
ocratic state in accordance with the 1967 borders. 
The political division between Hamas and Fatah had very hazardous con-
sequences politically, socially and economically, both strategically and in the 
short-term. It has emphasised the geographical separation between the West 
Bank and the Gaza strip that has been separated by Israeli restrictions. It has 
also led to the decline of the international and regional interest in the Palestinian 
issue. Moreover, the Arab Uprising in 2011 contributed greatly to the Arab dis-
interest in the Palestinian issue.  
The absence of a unified Palestinian leadership and political program, and 
the willingness of Hamas to continue its control over the Gaza Strip, has opened 
the gates for regional intervention and greater external influence on the Pales-
tinian cause, such as Qatar and Iran’s suspicious role in Gaza, which sustains 
the division.  
Besides that, the political division provided a pretext to the continuity of a 
political, economic, and social blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip by the Is-
raeli occupation and Egypt. Egypt sees Hamas as a security threat to its northern 
borders, considering that the Muslim Brotherhood is listed as a terrorist organi-
sation in Egypt and many Hamas activists joined the Islamic State in Sinai, kill-
ing hundreds of the Egyptian army personnel. Moreover, the social fabric has 
been disrupted, where the political division has been linked to a low level of 
trust amongst Palestinians32. There has also emerged a neo-bourgeoisie class 
benefiting from the continued separation and political division, originating 
mainly from Hamas elite and tunnel smugglers, amongst other illegal practices. 
Lastly, the economic situation has deteriorated, with rocketing levels of unem-
ployment among youth, rising suicide rates, and an authoritarian iron fist ruling 
both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
 
Tales of the Past: Hamas-Fatah Division:  
This section examines the political division between Hamas and Fatah from 
2007 up to today. It is based on a virtual focus group division and round tables 
with more than 25 Palestinian academics, researchers, activists and civil society 
professionals.33  
The current Palestinian division (2007-2019) is a continuous division within 
Palestinian society and its political system. There was also political division 
from 1994 to 2007. In 1995, the Palestinian forces of Fatah killed more than 
eight of Hamas’s activists in one day. The persecution and arrests of members 
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad continued from 1994 until 2006. At the same time, 
Hamas worked hard to undermine Fatah’s authority and power within 
 
32 Alijla, A. (2019). Political Division and Social Destruction: Generalized Trust in Palestine. 
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 12 (2), 81-104 . 
33 We would like to thank the following individuals for their participation on the virtual FGD 
and round table: Jehad Abu Salim, Majed Hudaib, Amer Daher, AbdelAziz Almasrti, Mohamed 
Hijazi, Iyad Abu Hujaier, Wael Al Moybayed, Sami Abu Salem, Omar Shaheen,  Maher Issa, 
Mohamed Hajj Mohamed, Bader Musleh and Ibrahim Hosh. 
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Palestinian society, as well as launching attacks against Israel in an attempt to 
undermine the peace process. The political conflict between Hamas and Fatah 
represented by the Palestinian Authority was not solved democratically, which 
led to a wave of political arrests by PA forces, as well as a counter wave of 
denouncing Fatah members, PA, and Arafat by Hamas. The Palestinian politi-
cal system and its apparatuses were not democratic and contained different ide-
ologies and political parties with different programmes and agendas. In contrast 
to the early years of the PLO, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have vastly different 
political programmes and agendas. Neither are members of the PLO, and they 
do not agree with its main programme. Therefore, Hamas was not part of what 
Arafat called the “Democracy of Guns”, which meant to engage Hamas on the 
bases of the PLO constitution.  
In addition to that, the current political division came as both Hamas and 
Fatah were competing over the political power of semi-political institutions (PA 
ministries). The conflict mounted over political interests as well as any ad-
vantage one party had over another. A major difference between the current 
division and the PLO factions’ divisions is their administrative portfolios, such 
as security, foreign affairs and the economy. The new version of the Palestinian 
division includes bureaucratic apparatuses which make it difficult for Fatah and 
Hamas to agree. Both parties have different political regional allies, and political 
agendas, as well as political, economic and nepotistic interests.  
Most participants in the virtual round tables and FGD stressed the fact that 
the current political division is empowered by regional powers such as Qatar, 
Iran, the USA and Israel. Both Fatah and Hamas have their own regional allies 
and agendas. Hamas, besides being the solo rebel government in Gaza, have 
sustained their power by relying on Qatar, and previously Syria and Iran as its 
allies. Any attempt for Hamas to move away from their allies means that they 
face being replaced in the PA, which has created continuous distrust between 
Fatah and Hamas. For example, Qatar has been funding the Hamas de-facto 
government with $15 million in cash monthly since the beginning of 2019, 
which has allowed Hamas to sustain its political and administrative mandate 
over the Gaza Strip. Regional powers who are hostile to each other, mainly 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Israel and Egypt, have used the Palestinian division 
as a political tool amid their own conflicts. 
Besides that, the absence of a charismatic leader like Yasser Arafat has led 
to further division. Arafat was seen as the leader of the Palestinian people and 
his authority is indisputable. When Arafat passed away in 2004, no Palestinian 
leader was able to replace him, and thus political division deepened by an erup-
tion of Palestinian leaders who wanted to inherit Arafat’s position.  
The Israeli right-wing government also benefits from the current political 
division. The Israeli government aims to maintain the status-quo of “no war, no 
peace” to implement its own agenda where neither Hamas nor the PLO (West 
Bank) will have an independent Palestinian state, rather, they will both have 
security and bureaucratic apparatuses with semi-state functions.  
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The geographical division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has 
contributed to the political division which had been previously sustained 
through the social division led by divisive Israeli politics. Since 1990, Israel has 
imposed new rules on the Gaza Strip which have not permitted Gazans to move 
to or work in the West Bank. 
 
Conclusion 
The Palestinian political division is not new. It has been part of the Palestinian 
struggle for liberation since the early years of the 20th century. This paper ex-
plored the history of the Palestinian political division from the end of the Otto-
mans’ control over Palestine in 1916. Since the beginning of the British mandate 
in Palestine, the Palestinian struggle was characterised by tribal conflict and 
conflict between elitist families, leading to the failure of the Palestinian attempts 
for independence. Prior to 1948, Palestinians were divided into two camps; one 
represented by the Nashashibi family and the other by the Husayni family. Each 
family had their allies and formed their own political parties that represented 
their ideologies. However, both were engaged directly or indirectly with the 
British authorities in order to maximise their shares of power.  
In 1936, the Palestinians embarked on their first revolution, which lasted for 
years. However, it failed as a result of the political divisions among the Pales-
tinians. The division was a result of the conflicts in Jerusalem between the Hu-
saynis and Nashashibis. While the Nashashibi family tended to cooperate with 
the British and believed in the potential for settlement and coexistence with the 
Jews, the Husayni family, led by Hajj Amin, was reluctant to deal with the Brit-
ish government, enabling the Zionist movement to tighten its grip on Palestine.  
After 1948, the Palestinians were persecuted and prevented from forming 
any political power outside the influence of the Egyptian and the Jordanian re-
gime. Therefore, the deep division in Palestine continued until the formation of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which at first was met with suspicion. 
After the PLO was established as a political umbrella for all Palestinian factions, 
there was, for the first time in modern history for the Palestinians, a political 
body with a charter. The PLO charter formed the constitution, where all factions 
shared its main guidelines, and no faction withdrew completely from the PLO 
over any issues of conflict. The powerful and charismatic Arafat and other lead-
ers, such as George Habash, manoeuvred skilfully within the political division, 
where the use of weapons did not occur until regional power (for example, 
Syria) mobilised a few Palestinian factions and leaders to stand against Arafat 
and his control over the PLO. Despite those difficulties, from the 1960s to 2006, 
there was no serious division among the Palestinians. This was the case even 
when the Palestinians were on a Palestinian land (1994-2006). 
The Hamas-Fatah division is an ideological division where Hamas, as an 
Islamist party, does not tolerate a secular party, or a society with secular princi-
ples, therefore, since 2007, they have attempted on many occasions to enforce 
an Islamic code in the Gaza Strip. Besides that, Hamas is not part of the PLO, 
and does not recognise PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. It sees 
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itself as a rival to the PLO, with a different political programme and path. Ha-
mas, in contrast to all PLO factions, does not agree with the Palestinian charter 
despite almost all Palestinian factions adopting its main guidelines and princi-
ples alongside their own programmes and charters.  
It seems that the objective of allowing Hamas to take power was to tame 
and transform its political position. The rules of the game, from 2005, was to 
put Hamas in a political corner. This was a success in that respect, yet the price 
was Palestinian political and social division. 
Several other factors have contributed to and sustained the recent political 
division among Palestinians; primarily, the intervention of regional political 
powers, Israel’s willingness to sustain the division, geographical separation, and 
the absence of a charismatic leader.  
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